Since a couple of years ago, new EU members are obligated to eventually become Euro members, and non-EU members need the agreement of the rest of the EU to have any say in how the Euro is managed (sure, non-EU countries can do the equivallent of dollarization with the Euro and just use it as currency or have a pegged currency, but that means no ability at all to participate in managing the currency which is what really matters for Germany in order to get all those sweet benefits of a currency managed taking in account weaker Economies) and there is only a handfull of small countries with such agreements.
By leaving the EU, Germany would immediatelly loose the right to have any say on things like how the Euro is managed and would have to negotiate any such things in the Exit Agreement.
So your “point” sounds a lot like the fantasism I heard in Britain from the Leave campaign: all about “we can still have this and that” whilst the reality was that ex-members are not entitled to an a la carte choice of all the things they want and have to negotiate it with the rest of the EU and since what comes out of that negotiation requires unanimous approval, they’re not going to get all that they want and what they do manage to get will cost them.
My point was meant differently than it may have sounded. Personally, as a German myself, I am open to leaving both the EU and the euro. I was only concerned with the implication that “Euro = EU”, which is factually wrong.
Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City have the euro, but are not in the EU; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden are in the EU, but do not yet have the euro. A special case is Denmark, which is currently the only EU country with a “non-participation option” that has decided not to introduce the euro in future either.
Yeah, you are technically correct that it is possible to be an Euro member outside the EU or an EU member outside the Euro.
So it’s not impossible for Germany to leave the EU and remain an Euro member.
Just like, technically, it’s entirelly possible to fall from a tall bridge and survive, so it’s not impossible to jump off a tall bridge and survive.
It’s just unlikely in practice and jumping off a tall bridge expecting to survive is either stupidity or insanity.
To see just how ultra-special it would be for a Germany outside the EU to still have full Euro member rights, notice how all non-EU countries which are Euro members have microscopic economies and have very special historic sovereignty arrangements with existing EU members: 2 principalities which are protectorates of France, one territory governed by France half of the year and Spain the other half, and a special enclave in Rome for the Catholic Church.
So my point still stands: Germany leaves the EU, Germany leaves the Euro, though with the tiny possibility that Germany gets all other 26 members - many of which gain massivelly from Germany leaving the Euro and some which have “scores to settle” with Germany on that since back in 2012 - to agree that Germany can stay with full rights (good luck with that, better not do it during an election year in Greece).
Any rational person would evaluate a possibiliy of Germany leaving the EU assuming the most likely consequences in related domains such as Euro membership rather than repeat the same silly fantasism of the Brexiters of assuming “we’re special so we can beat the odds” ('cause that worked so well…)
As I’ve seen in Britain, the highly irrational simpleton Nationalism that presumes some special specialness from having born in a specific geographical area, invariably presumes against all indications that such special country and special people will get all they want from the rest when they leave, and, well … those who actually get to decide what the EU will concede are the one that stay in the EU and they don’t really share the fantasies of the nationalist of the leaving country and are hardly going to act in the leaving nation’s best interests.
Sorta.
Since a couple of years ago, new EU members are obligated to eventually become Euro members, and non-EU members need the agreement of the rest of the EU to have any say in how the Euro is managed (sure, non-EU countries can do the equivallent of dollarization with the Euro and just use it as currency or have a pegged currency, but that means no ability at all to participate in managing the currency which is what really matters for Germany in order to get all those sweet benefits of a currency managed taking in account weaker Economies) and there is only a handfull of small countries with such agreements.
By leaving the EU, Germany would immediatelly loose the right to have any say on things like how the Euro is managed and would have to negotiate any such things in the Exit Agreement.
So your “point” sounds a lot like the fantasism I heard in Britain from the Leave campaign: all about “we can still have this and that” whilst the reality was that ex-members are not entitled to an a la carte choice of all the things they want and have to negotiate it with the rest of the EU and since what comes out of that negotiation requires unanimous approval, they’re not going to get all that they want and what they do manage to get will cost them.
My point was meant differently than it may have sounded. Personally, as a German myself, I am open to leaving both the EU and the euro. I was only concerned with the implication that “Euro = EU”, which is factually wrong.
Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City have the euro, but are not in the EU; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden are in the EU, but do not yet have the euro. A special case is Denmark, which is currently the only EU country with a “non-participation option” that has decided not to introduce the euro in future either.
Yeah, you are technically correct that it is possible to be an Euro member outside the EU or an EU member outside the Euro.
So it’s not impossible for Germany to leave the EU and remain an Euro member.
Just like, technically, it’s entirelly possible to fall from a tall bridge and survive, so it’s not impossible to jump off a tall bridge and survive.
It’s just unlikely in practice and jumping off a tall bridge expecting to survive is either stupidity or insanity.
To see just how ultra-special it would be for a Germany outside the EU to still have full Euro member rights, notice how all non-EU countries which are Euro members have microscopic economies and have very special historic sovereignty arrangements with existing EU members: 2 principalities which are protectorates of France, one territory governed by France half of the year and Spain the other half, and a special enclave in Rome for the Catholic Church.
So my point still stands: Germany leaves the EU, Germany leaves the Euro, though with the tiny possibility that Germany gets all other 26 members - many of which gain massivelly from Germany leaving the Euro and some which have “scores to settle” with Germany on that since back in 2012 - to agree that Germany can stay with full rights (good luck with that, better not do it during an election year in Greece).
Any rational person would evaluate a possibiliy of Germany leaving the EU assuming the most likely consequences in related domains such as Euro membership rather than repeat the same silly fantasism of the Brexiters of assuming “we’re special so we can beat the odds” ('cause that worked so well…)
As I’ve seen in Britain, the highly irrational simpleton Nationalism that presumes some special specialness from having born in a specific geographical area, invariably presumes against all indications that such special country and special people will get all they want from the rest when they leave, and, well … those who actually get to decide what the EU will concede are the one that stay in the EU and they don’t really share the fantasies of the nationalist of the leaving country and are hardly going to act in the leaving nation’s best interests.